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Summary
Officials of the Bush Administration believe military action against Iraq may be
necessary to eliminate threats posed by the Iraqi regime to the U.S. and international
communities.  President Bush has asked Congress to pass a joint resolution giving the
President authority to use force if necessary to eliminate threats posed by Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq.  Some Members of Congress, commentators, and analysts question the
Administration’s rationale for such action and its feasibility.  This report summarizes
arguments advanced by the Administration and by critics of the Administration’s
position.  It will be updated as the situation continues to develop.  For further reading,
see CRS Report RL31339,  Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Overview
Discussion continues between the Bush Administration and Congress and in the
international community about the rationale for military action against the Iraqi regime
and the feasibility of such action.  Supporters of a military option believe a campaign to
oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is probably the only way to compel Iraq’s
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, eliminate its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and terminate its ability to support international terrorism.
Opponents argue that resumption of U.N. weapons inspections with unfettered access
throughout Iraq might achieve the goal of ridding Iraq of WMD without a costly military
campaign, which could prove difficult to implement, and also could destabilize U.S. allies
in the region and divert resources from other phases of the war against terrorism.
President Bush has repeatedly called for regime change in Iraq.  In his speech before
the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002, the President emphasized the dangers
posed by Iraq’s programs to develop WMD and urged the United Nations to live up to its
responsibilities by enforcing previous U.N. Security Council resolutions that Iraq has
ignored.  On October 10 and 11, respectively, the House and Senate passed H.J.Res. 114,
which authorizes the President to use the U.S. Armed Forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing Iraqi threat and enforce all relevant
U.N. Security sanctions regarding Iraq.  At the international level, the U.S. and British
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delegations to the United Nations are drafting a resolution that reportedly would require
Iraq to demonstrate full cooperation with a reconstituted weapons inspection regime
within a relatively short period of time or face a military response.1
Hearings are being held by several congressional committees to discuss the possible
use of force against Iraq.  A number of questions have been raised at these hearings and
in other forums:  For example:  How serious is the threat posed by Iraq to the United
States and its allies?  How high are the likely costs and casualties that might result from
military options?  Are U.S. forces likely to face large-scale urban warfare in Baghdad and
other major population centers? What kind of regime might replace the present one?
How long would U.S. forces have to remain in Iraq?  What effect would major U.S.
military action against Iraq have on the war against terrorism and other U.S. objectives
in the Middle East?  Views expressed by officials from the Administration on these and
other issues are summarized below, followed by a summary of the views of their critics.
Rationale Advanced by Administration Officials
Credibility of U.N. Pronouncements.  Iraq has defied at least 16 U.N. Security
Council resolutions enacted since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, according to a
position paper published by the Administration on September 12, 2002.  Iraq has
concealed or falsified information on its programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); failed to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors; failed to account
for missing persons and property stolen during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait; continued
to repress its population; and periodically supported international terrorism.  By all
indications, senior Administration officials believe it will likely take military action to
end Iraq’s continued defiance of demands embodied in U.N. resolutions.  (See CRS Issue
Brief IB92117, Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.)  In
his address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, President Bush posed the
question: “Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside
without consequence?”2
Threat Posed by Lethal Weapons.  The Administration and its supporters
maintain that Iraq’s programs to develop WMD pose a threat to U.S. interests and allies.
Iraq is known to have developed biological and chemical warfare agents and used the
latter against its own population and neighboring Iran during the 1980s.  During the Gulf
war in 1991, Iraq fired conventional medium and long-range missiles at Israel and Saudi
Arabia.  Many U.S. officials and other commentators believe that Iraq was on the verge
of developing a nuclear weapons capability before its defeat in the Gulf war, and that it
retains considerable expertise in this field.  In their view, post-war inspections did not
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fully reveal the extent of Iraq’s weapons programs, which in some cases were reported
by Iraqi defectors.  Lacking an air-tight inspection regime, which Iraq has managed to
obstruct in the past, military action may be the only way to eliminate Iraq’s WMD
capabilities and the threats they pose.3  Iraq has already threatened to reject any
inspection regime that adds conditions to those contained in previous U.N. resolutions.
Terrorist Ties.  Iraq has appeared on the State Department’s annual list of
countries supporting international terrorism since August 1990.  Although no positive
proof has emerged to link Iraq to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there have been unconfirmed
reports of contacts between Iraqi agents and representatives of the Al Qaeda organization.
In late September 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cited “evolving”
intelligence reports indicating that Iraq has given safe haven to members of Al Qaeda and
supported their efforts to obtain WMD.4  Iraq has also been accused of mounting terrorist
actions against the United States and other countries, including an abortive attempt to
assassinate former President Bush in 1993.  In this context, military reprisals against Iraq
could support the President’s worldwide campaign against terrorism by dealing a blow
to one of its state sponsors.
Regime Change.  Ever since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. Administrations
have called for replacement of Saddam Hussein’s regime; Congress, too, has endorsed
regime change by enacting the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) in 1998 (P.L. 105-338).
Saddam’s tight control over his military and security apparatus, however, makes it
unlikely that he could be overthrown by a coup or by other non-military measures.  A
U.S.-led military campaign, the Bush Administration contends, may be the only way to
achieve Saddam’s overthrow and replacement by a more friendly and hopefully
democratic regime.  Administration officials suggest that such a regime could serve as a
model for democratization in the Arab World.  The U.S. role in its creation—if
successful—could enhance U.S. prestige in the Middle East—as President Bush stated
in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly, by “inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim
world.”
Internal Support.  Senior U.S. officials believe a majority of Iraqis would
welcome the overthrow of a regime that has long oppressed them.  Disaffection from the
Ba’thist regime is particularly strong among the Kurds, who have been leading targets of
repression, but is reportedly also rife among other segments of the Iraqi population.
Although many commentators discount the effectiveness of Iraq’s divided opposition
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groups, these groups have taken recent steps to heal rifts and coordinate their efforts,
though with mixed results.  According to press reports, the Bush Administration plans to
increase training and equipment supply for opposition elements, using funds already
authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.  Proponents of a wider role for the Iraqi
opposition suggest that under an optimum scenario, it could play a role similar to that of
the Afghan Northern Alliance, which helped U.S. forces topple the Taliban regime.5
(Many observers, however, are skeptical about the applicability of the Afghanistan model
to Iraq.)
Growing International Support.  Although friendly Middle East states continue
to voice opposition to major military action against Iraq, some commentators have long
maintained that regional leaders would quietly welcome a move against Saddam, if it
quickly and fully achieved the overthrow of his regime.  Many believe that other key
countries, such as China and France, will eventually support military action, since they
will not want to be perceived as “soft” on Saddam or implacably opposed to the policies
of the United States as the sole remaining superpower.  On September 18, Secretary
Rumsfeld reportedly told a congressional committee that “other countries,” which he did
not name, will assist the United States in various ways, including troops, bases, overflight
rights, and financial contributions, in the event of military action.  In this connection,
there have been recent signs that some moderate Arab states may be softening their
previous opposition to allowing large-scale U.S. military operations from their territory
against Iraq, provided a military campaign were authorized by a U.N. resolution.6
Views of Critics of Administration Policies
Premature Action.  A number of commentators including former high ranking
U.S. officials believe that advocates of a military option have not made a convincing case
in support of imminent military action against Iraq.  According to this view, a military
campaign may be premature until a reconstituted inspection team has been deployed and
given an opportunity to achieve its mission.  Several former U.S. military leaders have
suggested that the United States should exhaust diplomatic options before mounting a
military campaign against Iraq.7  Former National Security Advisor Lt. General (Retired)
Brent Scowcroft comments that “inspections would serve to keep him [Saddam Hussein]
off balance and under close supervision.”  He adds that if Saddam refuses unfettered
inspections or if the inspections uncover compelling evidence of a nuclear weapons
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capability, then the United States would have a more persuasive case to use military force
against Iraq.8
Effect on Anti-Terrorism Campaign and Alliance Relations.  Skeptics of
the Administration’s approach maintain that a major campaign against Iraq could detract
from U.S. efforts to pursue other phases of its war on terrorism.  They assert that
continued low level conflict in Afghanistan argues against diverting major military
resources to another area of operations.  Most Arab and Muslim states, opposed in
principle to U.S. action against Iraq, might be less willing to continue cooperating with
the United States in its on-going attempts to root out Al Qaeda cells and shut off sources
of terrorist funding.  Elsewhere, only Britain has expressed willingness to join in military
action if necessary, and other European allies have expressed reservations or opposition.
General Scowcroft points out that “there is a virtual consensus in the world against an
attack on Iraq at this time” and adds that the United States cannot win the war against
terrorism “without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.”
Operational and Logistical Difficulties.  The challenges of a military campaign
could be formidable.  Emergence of a large allied coalition backing a U.S.-led military
campaign against Iraq along the lines of the 1990-1991 Gulf war is unlikely.  Most
regional states have publicly rejected use of their territories as launching pads for such
a campaign, and many observers believe that any cooperation they may provide in
facilitating staging, landing, refueling, and overflight by U.S. forces is likely to be
limited.  (See CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, for a discussion of facilities available in the Gulf region.)  Recent
press reports indicate that Iraqi defense plans call for abandoning open desert terrain and
retreating to Baghdad and other major cities where U.S. forces could face large-scale
urban fighting.  Also, should Saddam decide that he has nothing to lose in view of U.S.
demands for his elimination, critics are concerned that he would use his chemical and
biological warfare capabilities against allied forces and Israel;9 whereas the prospect of
retaining power even in defeat effectively restrained him from such use during the Gulf
war of 1990-1991.
Regional Destabilization.  A U.S. military campaign against Iraq could
precipitate serious turmoil in the Middle East, according to critics of Administration
policy.  Many fear that massive popular demonstrations against the United States and
U.S. interests may occur and could lead to upheavals in which one or more moderate pro-
U.S. leaders were replaced by radical anti-western regimes, possibly headed by Islamic
fundamentalists sympathetic to Al Qaeda.  For example, King Abdullah of Jordan, with
his large Palestinian population and economic dependence on Iraqi oil and commerce,
could be vulnerable in this regard.  U.S. efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict would
probably be adversely impacted by a war with Iraq, some believe, with the further loss
of U.S. credibility in large parts of the Arab world.  Some commentators, including the
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former commander of U.S. forces in the Gulf region, General Anthony Zinni, see merit
in pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement before moving against Iraq.10
Economic Impact.  Some critics of Administration policy believe that a war with
Iraq could contribute to U.S. economic problems.  Cost estimates of a war with Iraq vary,
but could be higher than during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.11  The head of President
Bush’s National Economic Council, Lawrence Lindsey, has estimated the “upper bound”
of war costs at between $100 billion and $200 billion, a small but significant share of the
U.S. gross domestic product.  Pentagon estimates of approximately $50 billion are
considerably lower, but may represent a campaign of shorter duration and do not appear
to include reconstruction costs.  The Congressional Budget Office study published on
September 30, 2002, based on force packages somewhat smaller than those used in the
1990-1991 Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, estimated costs of deploying a
force to the Persian Gulf at between $9 and $13 billion, followed by monthly costs of
between $6 and $9 billion, plus possible costs of an occupation and additional
redeployment costs at the end of the operation.12  In contrast to the situation in 1990-
1991, when Arab and other donors paid $53.6 billion of the $61.1 billion costs incurred
by the United States in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,  third countries are
unlikely to foot much of the bill for a new campaign against Iraq, which most of them do
not favor.  Beyond the direct budgetary impact, there could be increases in oil prices and
disruptions in oil supply to the United States and its allies, although such problems
proved short-lived during the 1990-1991 crisis.
Uncertain Outcomes.  In conclusion, critics argue, even if an allied force
succeeded in overthrowing the present Iraqi leadership, a post-Saddam Iraq would
involve many uncertainties.  In their view, several unfavorable outcomes are distinctly
possible: an extended U.S. military occupation while attempting to put in place a new
order in Iraq; another dictator who might prove little better than Saddam; a new and more
representative regime which nonetheless retains Saddam’s determination to pursue WMD
for reasons of national prestige and security; or the fragmentation of Iraq along
geographic and ethnic lines.  The latter outcome would be of particular concern to several
U.S. allies including Turkey, which fears that a possible upsurge in Kurdish separatist
sentiment in northern Iraq could spread to Turkey’s own Kurdish population.  More
broadly, fragmentation of Iraq could be exploited by other neighbors such as Iran or Syria
or by hostile Islamic militant groups, with unforeseen consequences to U.S. interests in
the Middle East.
